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Independent scientific analysis and advice are essential for effective policies  
that serve the public interest. This report describes new and ongoing threats to  
the communication of science and its use in public health and environmental  
decisions, and it recommends steps Congress can take in response.
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Introduction
F
ederally sponsored scientific research  
and technology development have brought 
us the ability to explore outer space, con-
vert sunlight into electricity, build super-
computers, predict weather patterns, manufacture 
self-driving vehicles, and use assisted reproductive 
technologies to give birth. Taxpayer-funded  
science and scientists also improve our quality  
of  life by finding cures to cancer and other dead-
ly diseases, developing technologies that protect 
public health and safety, and inventing means  
for enhancing national security. When conducted 
appropriately, government science programs  
yield enormous benefits. 
 However, when political interference occurs—
such as politically motivated censorship, misrep-
resentation of  scientific findings, or the suppres-
sion of  the free flow of  information from the 
government to the public—public health and 
well-being suffer. Political interference in the  
way the government communicates science and 
uses it to inform policy is a long-term challenge to  
protecting public health, safety,  and the environ-
ment. All modern presidential administrations 
have politicized science in some way. However, 
scientific integrity at federal agencies has eroded 
recently, with serious consequences for public 
trust and our government’s ability to respond  
to problems.
 Agency leaders have ignored and mischarac-
terized scientific evidence on climate change, 
worker compensation, and reproductive health. 
They have cut themselves off from expert advice 
that could lead to cleaner air and safer workplaces. 
They have suppressed information that could 
help families, national parks, and communities 
better protect themselves from environmental 
threats, while weakening enforcement of   
environmental laws.
 To fulfill their Congressionally established  
missions, agencies must have well-qualified lead-
ers who respect the laws they are tasked with  
implementing—but many political appointees 
lack basic relevant credentials or exhibit outright 
hostility to the missions of  their agencies, and  
several have resigned over conflicts of  interest  
or improper use of  agency resources. To use  
taxpayer dollars efficiently, agencies must attract 
and retain skilled civil servants—but as scientists 
face abuses of  scientific integrity and limits on 
their communication with the public and scien-
tific peers, morale suffers and employees depart. 
Finally, when employees blow the whistle on abuses, 
they often face retaliation, which discourages  
others from speaking out.
To fulfill their Congressionally mandated 
missions, agencies must have well- 
qualified leaders who respect the laws 
they are tasked with implementing.
 This report describes new and ongoing threats 
to the use of  science in public health and environ-
mental decisions and recommends steps Congress 
can take in response. Each chapter investigates 
one kind of  problem and suggests solutions.  
Several of  the recommendations apply to  
multiple chapters:
•	 Reveal abuses of scientific integrity:  
Holding hearings, seeking information from 
agency heads, and requesting investigations  
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by Inspectors General and the Government 
Accountability Office, as well as Congres- 
sional investigations (using subpoena authority  
if  necessary), can reveal when agencies have 
suppressed, ignored, or failed to appropriately 
use scientific evidence—and help to discourage 
such actions in the future.
•	 Hold appointees accountable: All members 
of  Congress can hold appointees to high stan-
dards through hearings, investigations, and 
subpoenas. When nominees are subject to  
confirmation, senators should carefully vet 
them and vote against any who are unquali-
fied, conflicted, or demonstrate disrespect  
for science or agency missions.
•	 Pass protective laws: Legislation such as 
 the Scientific Integrity Act and the Executive 
Branch Comprehensive Ethics Enforcement 
Act can create stronger enforcement mech-
anisms and better protect whistleblowers,  
encouraging employees who witness problems 
to speak up.
The organizations that contributed to this report 
work to ensure that U.S. policy decision-making is 
fully informed by scientific evidence and the best 
available data, and that the public has reliable 
access to independent scientific information and 
analysis produced and acquired by the federal 
government without political interference. 
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C h a p t e r  1 
Politicization of Science 
within Agencies
In several recent proposed rules,  
agencies have failed to uphold their  
responsibilities to consider relevant  
evidence and provide the public   
with necessary information.
S
cientific evidence plays a critical  
role in public health decision-making.  
In recent regulatory actions, however, 
several federal agencies have sidelined 
scientific evidence and the best available data. 
This section discusses several examples of  this 
alarming trend and demonstrates why undermin-
ing science in federal decision-making imperils 
the integrity of  the rulemaking process, erodes 
public trust, and interferes with people’s ability  
to make decisions about their health and lives 
with the best available information.
multiple agencies DisregarD  
science in rulemaking
The rulemaking process is designed to provide 
sufficient information and analysis to allow the 
public to adequately evaluate federal agency pro-
posals. In several recent proposed rules, agencies 
have failed to uphold their responsibilities to con-
sider relevant evidence and provide the public 
with necessary information. In some cases, these 
rules have misrepresented the state of  scientific 
knowledge or practice, denying stakeholders the 
opportunity to make well-informed comments 
that could improve regulations and risking  
erosion of  public trust in the federal government.
rule on contraceptive coverage exemption 
mischaracterizes health research 
Under the Affordable Care Act, most health  
insurance plans must cover methods of  contracep-
tion approved by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion (FDA) without cost-sharing. In an October 
2017 Interim Final Rule expanding exemptions 
for employers and universities not wishing to  
cover some or all forms of  contraception (IRS, 
EBSA, and HHS 2017), the U.S. Department  
of  Health and Human Services (HHS) and other 
agencies misrepresented the extensive body of  
research on contraception and health (NPWF, 
JIWH, and UCS 2017).
 The agencies claimed that there is “complexity 
and uncertainty in the relationship between con-
traceptive access, contraceptive use, and unintended 
pregnancy” (IRS, EBSA, and HHS 2017) when,  
in fact, evidence demonstrates that access to and 
use of  contraception is associated with a reduction 
in unintended pregnancies, and manufacturers  
of  all FDA-approved methods have had to dem-
onstrate that their products are safe and effective 
through randomized controlled trials (NPWF, 
JIWH, and UCS 2017). In the interim rule, the 
agencies asserted lack of  benefits, even though 
the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) deemed family planning one of  the 10 
great public health achievements of  the 20th  
century (CDC 1999). The agencies also claimed 
greater risks than actually exist, especially when 
considering that carrying a pregnancy to term 
poses far greater risks to women’s health than  
using contraception (CDC 2018; CDC 2017). 
Many of  the studies cited were of  poor quality 
and/or out of  date, and the rule did not reference 
several high-quality sources of  evidence that 
6  |  Protecting Science at Federal Agencies: How Congress Can Help
census adds untested Question  
on citizenship 
U.S. Secretary of  Commerce Wilbur Ross   
decided to include a citizenship question on the 
2020 Census (Ross 2018), despite the fact that 
the question has not been asked on the full  
Census since 1950 and has not undergone the 
multiyear process for suggesting and testing new 
questions that the U.S. Census Bureau uses in  
the current era (Pritzker and Gutierrez 2018). 
The U.S. Department of  Justice (DOJ) initiated 
the request for including a citizenship question 
under the guise of  protecting the Voting Rights 
Act (VRA). However, in a Congressional hearing 
on May 18, 2018, the acting head of  DOJ’s  
Civil Rights Division, John M. Gore, acknowl-
edged that enforcement of  the VRA, passed in 
1965, has never depended on the use of  Census 
citizenship enumeration data directly (Latner 
2018). Moreover, the administration’s previous 
collaboration with anti-science perpetrators of  
“voter fraud” myths raises concerns that citizen-
ship data would be used to enact strict voter  
suppression laws (Parks 2018; Huseman 2017).
 While evidence of  benefits from adding a citi-
zenship question to the Census is scant, evidence 
of  likely harms is compelling. Indeed, we know 
from Census analysis that Latino populations are 
already undercounted (Mule 2008), such that the 
addition of  a question that would further reduce 
response rates among legal immigrant residents 
will create artificially low population estimates of  
VRA-protected groups, making it more difficult 
to identify and remedy VRA violations. The  
addition of  a citizenship question is far more 
likely to inhibit the successful trial of  VRA cases 
by increasing the inaccuracy of  the Census than 
to improve the assessment of  VRA claims due  
to greater precision. Even Thomas Brunell, once 
a candidate to direct the 2020 Census, recently 
acknowledged that the administration is not 
making a scientific move, but “a political decision” 
(Mervis 2018). Recently, the U.S. Court of   
Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed that  
Commerce Secretary Ross can be deposed in 
a suit filed by several states and advocacy groups 
CDC experts likely would have recommended  
if  the rule’s authors had sought their expertise.
 Federal agencies have long been trusted sources 
of  information on public health, but issuing rules 
that misrepresent the science on an important 
public health topic threatens to erode public trust 
in our health agencies. Weakening the credibility 
of  public health agencies can undermine their 
ability to promote healthy behaviors in the face  
of  diseases and other health threats.
The Centers for Disease Control  
and Prevention deemed family planning 
one of the 10 great public health 
achievements of the 20th century. 
tip rule omits Quantitative analysis 
In December 2017, a notice of  proposed rule- 
making (NPRM) from the U.S. Department of  
Labor (DOL) proposed to rescind a portion of  tip 
regulations that prohibit tip pooling. Under this 
proposal, DOL would allow certain employers to 
withhold workers’ tips in order to share a portion 
with non-tipped employees (DOL 2017). The  
proposal did not include a quantitative estimate 
of  how much money would be shifted away  
from tipped workers under the proposal.
 Days before the comment period closed,  
Bloomberg News reported that DOL had in fact  
undertaken a quantitative analysis of  the rule’s 
impacts, but leadership reportedly requested  
revisions after seeing the unfavorable findings  
and then ultimately omitted the data from the 
NPRM altogether (Penn 2018a). DOL’s Office  
of  Inspector General is in the midst of  an   
audit of  the rulemaking process (Penn 2018b). 
The exclusion of  this analysis from the NPRM  
jeopardizes the integrity of  the rulemaking  
process and public trust that government- 
funded analysis will be accessible to the public.
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seeking to block the inclusion of  the question, 
given evidence that Secretary Ross was not accu-
rate in his Congressional testimony claiming that 
the question request came from DOJ (Thrush 
and Liptak 2018). 
epa proposes rule that would restrict  
use of science in rulemaking 
In April 2018, the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) announced a proposed rule titled 
“Strengthening Transparency in Regulatory  
Science” (EPA 2018a). This proposal is the  
agency iteration of  the failed 2017 Honest  
and Open New EPA Science Treatment Act 
(HONEST Act), a problematic bill previously 
introduced as the Secret Science Reform Act. 
These bills were long championed by Represen-
tative Lamar Smith, chairman of  the House 
Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, 
whose office then worked with political appoin-
tees at EPA to “internally implement” the  
legislation (Eilperin and Dennis 2018). 
 As the bills would have done, this proposed 
rule would effectively prevent EPA from using  
the best available science to protect public health 
and the environment by requiring that all raw 
data, models, code, and other materials used in 
crafting a regulation be available to the public. 
Although making data publicly available may 
sound beneficial, allowing regulators to only con-
sider studies whose data are public would sharply 
reduce the number of  high-quality studies the 
agency could consider when setting standards. 
EPA rules significantly rely on research involving 
public health data, which are often confidential 
due to privacy concerns, as well as on confiden-
tial business information. The draft rule does  
not explain whether or how the agency would 
continue to rely on public studies that use indi-
viduals’ confidential data to examine the impacts 
of  air pollution and toxic chemicals on health.  
If, under the rule, EPA refused to consider such 
studies in rulemaking, it would effectively ham-
string its ability to carry out its mission to protect 
human health. Both the failed bills and the pro-
posed rule have received significant pushback 
from the scientific community (Meyer 2018).  
 While the substance of  this rule is in itself  
troubling, the process used to promulgate the  
rule was equally problematic. The agency failed 
to request input beforehand from the public, its 
own science advisor’s office, or its own Science 
Advisory Board, and proposed a rule that lacks 
detail on crucial matters (Tollefson 2018) and 
misrepresents trends in peer-reviewed publishing 
(Berg et al. 2018). The rule did not undergo the 
standard review process at the Office of  Infor-
mation and Regulatory Affairs, and perhaps as  
a result does not include the kind of  detailed 
analysis of  impacts that would allow stakeholders 
to evaluate the rule (Hassan et al. 2018).
EPA’s rule does not explain whether  
or how the agency would continue to rely 
on public studies that use individuals’ 
confidential data to examine the impacts 
of air pollution and toxic chemicals  
on health.
 Because this proposal was based on the   
HONEST Act rather than an internal agency 
process, the Department of  the Interior (DOI) 
has already developed and implemented similar 
guidance. Agencies might also adopt other failed 
legislation, such as the Better Evaluation of  Science 
and Technology Act (BEST Act), which proposed 
applying scientific standards language from the 
recently updated Toxic Substances Control Act  
to all federal rulemaking. The BEST Act would 
have frozen scientific standards and hindered 
agencies’ ability to utilize the best and most  
up-to-date scientific information (Kothari 2017).
political interference in grants
The federal grantmaking process should operate 
transparently and in accordance with the goals  
of  each grant program, not the personally held 
beliefs and goals of  political appointees. However, 
recent events have raised concerns about funding 
decisions based on political considerations rather 
than established program goals and criteria. In 
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some cases, grant funding was abruptly termi-
nated before a research project could be finished. 
Halting a study before data collection or analysis 
can be completed essentially wastes the money 
already expended, and denies the agency and the 
public the knowledge that a completed project 
would have yielded (Abraham et al. 2017). It is 
also at odds with the approach recommended by 
the bipartisan Commission on Evidence-Based 
Policymaking (Abraham et al. 2017).
Grantees across the country faced the loss of   
approximately $200 million in total funding to 
replicate a wide variety of  evidence-based pro-
grams or conduct rigorous evaluation of  promis-
ing approaches to continue building knowledge. 
HHS gave no explanation for these actions and  
in recent months, four federal judges have found 
HHS’s termination of  the TPP Program grants 
to be unlawful (Hellman 2018). In the midst  
of  these court decisions, in April 2018, OAH  
released two new Tier 1 and Tier 2 funding  
opportunity announcements (FOAs) that repre-
sent a troubling departure from the rigorous stan-
dards of  evidence and evaluation that the TPP 
Program has used in the past. For example, the 
current FOAs fail to reference the HHS Teen 
Pregnancy Prevention Evidence Review, an  
independent, systematic, and rigorous review  
of  evaluation studies managed by the HHS  
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation 
(HHS 2018). In addition, the FOAs prioritize a 
single approach that emphasizes abstinence or 
returning to abstinence rather than funding for a 
variety of  programs that are grounded in evidence. 
Several lawsuits have been filed against the FOAs 
(Uzzell and Troiano 2018). Federal judges in  
Oregon and New York have ruled that the  
administration’s Tier 1 FOA violated Congres-
sional intent, and blocked HHS from proceeding 
to award funds under that FOA (Democracy  
Forward 2018).
political review of epa grants
In a sharp departure from practices under past 
Republican and Democratic administrations, 
EPA Deputy Associate Administrator for the  
Office of  Public Affairs John Konkus began  
personally reviewing all grant solicitations and 
awards. Konkus reportedly told staff he was look-
ing out for mentions of  “climate change,” and 
canceled nearly $2 million in grants that had 
been competitively awarded to universities and 
nonprofit organizations. Around the time that 
U.S. Senator Lisa Murkowski, a Republican from 
Alaska, voted against a healthcare bill that most 
of  her Republican colleagues supported, EPA 
Halting a study before data collection or 
analysis can be completed essentially 
wastes the money already expended, 
and denies the agency and the public 
the knowledge that a completed project 
would have yielded.
early termination of teen pregnancy  
prevention grants 
The Teen Pregnancy Prevention Program (TPP 
Program), administered by the HHS Office of  
Adolescent Health (OAH), has been lauded by 
independent experts as a strong example of  evi-
dence-based policymaking. Established by Con-
gress in fiscal year (FY) 2010, it uses a two-tiered 
approach, with 75% of  funding designated to 
replicate evidence-based program models that 
have proven under rigorous evaluation to change 
behavior (Tier 1), and 25% to support the devel-
opment, implementation, and rigorous evaluation 
of  innovative approaches or significant adapta-
tions of  existing models (Tier 2). The September 
2017 unanimously agreed–to report from the  
bipartisan Commission on Evidence-Based  
Policymaking established by House Speaker  
Paul Ryan and Senator Patty Murray highlighted 
the TPP Program as an example of  a federal  
program developing increasingly rigorous port-
folios of  evidence (Abraham et al. 2017).
 In the summer of  2017, OAH notified more 
than 80 TPP Program grantees that their five-year 
projects would end two years early (Kay 2017). 
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staffers were instructed without explanation to 
halt grants to Alaska. In explaining how unusual 
such a practice was, former EPA administrator 
Christine Todd Whitman (who served in the  
administration of  President George W. Bush)  
told the Washington Post, “We didn’t do a politi- 
cal screening on every grant, because many  
of  them were based on science, and political  
appointees don’t have that kind of  background” 
(Eilperin 2017a).
halting of national academies studies
DOI abruptly instructed the National Academies 
of  Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine to cease 
work on two studies that were under way on  
impacts of  fossil fuel activities: a study into the 
health impacts of  a mining technique known as 
“mountaintop removal” on people living near 
central Appalachia mine sites (Fears 2018) and  
an investigation into how DOI’s Bureau of  Safety 
and Environmental Enforcement could improve 
its inspections of  offshore oil and gas develop-
ment to avoid another catastrophic incident like 
the fatal 2010 Deepwater Horizon explosion 
(Fears 2017). Such research has the potential  
to improve health and stability in areas where 
mining and marine oil drilling operations occur. 
In June 2018, DOI’s Inspector General found 
that DOI officials failed to provide sufficient  
documents justifying the decision to stop the 
mountaintop removal study (Fears 2018).
cancellation of office of population affairs  
research grants
In 2017, two Title X research grants funded  
by the Office of  Population Affairs (OPA) were 
abruptly cancelled. The first was a five-year grant 
to the Guttmacher Institute, a leading research 
and policy organization focusing on domestic  
and global reproductive and sexual health. This 
grantee was notified at the start of  year four that 
the grant was being cut short “due to changes in 
program priorities” (Manning 2017); Guttmacher 
had long had a grant agreement with OPA to  
assess the need for provision and impact of   
publicly funded family planning services in the 
United States. A second grant, for three years to 
the University of  California–San Francisco, was 
shortened to one year, also under the auspices of  
the federal government’s changing programmatic 
priorities. This grant supported research to validate 
a patient-reported outcome performance measure 
of  contraceptive counseling. 
OPA’s FY 2018 grant opportunities  
make no mention of the word  
“contraception” and invite applications 
for abstinence-only education and  
natural family planning, as opposed to 
providers offering comprehensive family 
planning care for those most in need.
undermining the title X program’s ability  
to support Quality, evidence-based care 
Title X grants are typically three years in length. 
In 2017, all Title X grantees were notified their 
projects had been shortened so that they would 
end in 2018. Several grantees were only in the 
first year of  what were originally three-year 
grants. Similar to the shortening of  the TPP  
Program grants, no specific reason was given  
to grantees. Subsequently, OPA released an FY 
2018 FOA that makes no mention of  the word 
“contraception” and invites applications for  
abstinence-only education and natural family 
planning, as opposed to providers offering com-
prehensive family planning care for those most  
in need (National Family Planning and Reproductive 
Health Association v. Azar 2018). It also fails to  
mention nationally recognized clinical standards 
for quality family planning (Coleman et al. 2018). 
In August 2018, OPA awarded service grants to 
several organizations that responded to the FOA, 
but the grants last only seven months, rather  
than the three years that have been standard  
(NFPRHA 2018).
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proposeD solutions
Federal agencies must consider scientific informa-
tion when making health and environmental poli-
cy decisions, and the use of  scientific information 
must be protected from undue influence. Con-
gress has an important oversight role, which can 
minimize the politicization of  science, promote 
transparency, and bolster the use of  the best avail-
able science in agency decision-making. Specific 
recommendations include: 
cuts or policy riders that harm the scientific 
process or impede the use of  science in  
decision-making. 
•	 Congress	should	pass	legislation	that	codifies	
protections for science and reject legislation 
that would harm agencies’ use of  science in 
policymaking. Especially when unsuccessful 
and harmful legislative ideas are being pro-
mulgated as agency policy (e.g., the Secret  
Science Reform Act), proactive protections  
for science are crucial.
•	 When	considering	confirmation	of 	an	admin-
istration’s nominees, senators should consider 
nominees’ records of  either supporting or  
undermining science. It is imperative that 
Congress use its imbued powers to safeguard 
our nation’s health and well-being by making 
sure that federal agency leaders are committed 
to using the best available information, includ-
ing independent, peer-reviewed science. 
conclusion
When science is politicized, agencies and the 
public are denied access to independent infor-
mation and unable to make fully informed  
decisions. We as a nation need to ensure that  
we are addressing the pressing issues facing  
communities by using and disseminating  
accurate, high-quality scientific information. 
Federal agencies must make health  
and environmental policy decisions 
based on scientific information, and  
the information must be protected  
from undue influence. 
•	 Congress	should	conduct	hearings	on	issues		
of  political interference in science and seek  
information from agencies through letters and 
subpoenas. Congress should also encourage  
Government Accountability Office and  
Inspector General investigations where   
appropriate.  
•	 Congress	should	use	the	appropriations	process	
to protect the scientific enterprise by ensuring 
that funds are spent as Congress intended and 
rejecting attempts to politicize science through 
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C h a p t e r  2 
Threats to Science Advisory  
Committees and Science Advice
T
he federal government has traditionally 
relied upon scientific advice from the 
president’s science advisor, the White 
House Office of  Science and Technology 
Policy, the President’s Council on Science and 
Technology, and advisory committees across  
federal agencies. Many federal agencies and even 
the White House have failed to take advantage of  
this science advice infrastructure, and the current 
administration has even issued sweeping direc-
tives that undercut many such advisory bodies 
(Reed et al. 2018). This section examines several 
of  the most egregious cases of  sidelining science 
advice under this administration and explains 
why these changes erode public trust and inter-
fere with people’s ability to make decisions about  
their health and lives with the best available  
information. 
environmental protection agency
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)  
has 22 advisory committees operating under the 
Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), six of  
which are dedicated to providing scientific advice 
to the agency (EPA 2018b). On October 31, 
2017, then-EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt issued 
a directive that banned academic scientists who 
receive grants from EPA from serving on EPA 
federal advisory committees (Pruitt 2017a). He 
gave them a choice: either give up their grants 
and remain on the committees, or keep their 
grants and resign. The stated reason for then-
Administrator Pruitt’s policy shift was to obtain 
independent advice and avoid conflicts of  interest 
associated with the receipt of  research funding 
from EPA. However, no parallel prohibition was 
made for industry scientists or academic scientists 
who receive industry funding, so the result has 
been to increase the number of  industry-affiliated 
committee members while decreasing the number 
of  academics (Reed et al. 2018). Committees  
affected by the directive include the Science  
Advisory Board (SAB), which provides advice  
The organizations and processes for  
selecting advisory committee members 
and managing the advisory committees 
are completely separate from those  
involved in the grant award process.
on scientific issues and assessments that cut across 
the agency; the Board of  Scientific Counselors 
(BOSC), which provides an independent review 
of  EPA’s research program; and the Clean Air 
Scientific Advisory Committee (CASAC), which 
stems from a Clean Air Act requirement that an 
independent scientific advisory committee review 
EPA’s scientific criteria for setting national ambi-
ent air quality standards and recommend to the 
administrator any new standards and revisions  
of  existing standards. 
 This disingenuous definition of  “conflict of  
interest” is both unnecessary and harmful. EPA 
already has policies and processes in place to  
prevent advisors with conflicts of  interest from 
serving on committees (EPA 2018c). The organi-
zations and processes for selecting advisory com-
mittee members and managing the advisory  
committees are completely separate from those 
involved in the grant award process. The SAB 
staff is located in the Office of  the Administrator 
and is responsible for the management of  both 
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 When Administrator Pruitt resigned and was 
replaced by Andrew Wheeler as acting adminis-
trator, it was not clear whether Wheeler would 
follow his predecessor’s footsteps by continuing  
to erode science advice at EPA. While Acting Ad-
ministrator Wheeler publicly stated his intention 
to “seek the facts” from EPA staff, he also told the 
Washington Post that he understood “the desire to 
make sure that the people serving on the board 
weren’t also benefiting from science grants from 
the agency” (Dennis and Eilperin 2018). Further, he 
allowed EPA to eliminate scientific review panels 
for ozone and particulate matter, almost ensuring 
that future air pollution decisions will not be fully 
informed by the best available science, which  
violates the Clean Air Act (Goldman 2018).
Department of the interior
At DOI, Secretary Ryan Zinke announced in 
May 2017 that the department would be formally 
reviewing the “charter and charge” of  its 200-plus 
advisory committees and would postpone all 
scheduled meetings through the fall (Streater 
2017). At the end of  the review period, DOI  
disbanded its Advisory Committee on Climate 
Change and Natural Resource Science. This 
committee had been charged with helping  advise 
the Secretary on managing natural resources  
in the face of  climate change (Doyle and   
Patterson 2017).
 Additionally, when the freeze was finally lifted 
on some DOI advisory committees, a new charter 
for at least one committee had shifted its mem-
bership breakdown to favor industry interests. 
DOI’s Royalty Policy Committee (RPC) was  
established in 2004 to make decisions about the 
revenues collected from resource extraction leases 
on federal and tribal lands (GSA 2017). Secretary 
Zinke changed the charter of  the committee  
and recommissioned it, shifting the committee’s 
balance by including one fewer member repre-
senting the public and one more representing  
the energy industry (Peterson 2017). Further,  
all of  the “public interest” RPC members come 
from academia or even industry; none of  them 
represent NGOs or advocacy organizations. In 
other words, the committee effectively has no 
SAB and CASAC. Potential committee members 
are screened by staff for expertise and potential 
conflicts of  interest before they are allowed to 
participate in any new advisory activities. They 
are hired as special government employees and 
are paid for their service to the agency. Grants, 
meanwhile, are awarded by EPA’s Office of   
Research and Development to applicants in a 
Acting Administrator Andrew Wheeler  
allowed EPA to eliminate scientific  
review panels for ozone and particulate 
matter, almost ensuring that future  
air pollution decisions will not be fully  
informed by the best available science, 
which violates the Clean Air Act.
highly competitive process in which proposals  
are judged first for their scientific merit and  
second for their relevance to EPA’s mission, EPA’s 
research objectives, and the needs of  its program 
offices. Ana Diez Roux, former chair of  CASAC, 
said, “The top scientists, the ones most qualified 
to provide objective and transparent scientific  
advice to EPA, are of  course the scientists who 
will likely be the most successful at obtaining 
highly competitive federal grants. . . . It would  
be a disservice to the American public to exclude 
those most qualified from serving on these panels” 
(Thulin 2017).
 Former Administrator Pruitt followed through 
on his policy shift by not renewing the committee 
membership of  academic scientists whose terms 
expired in 2017, even though past practice was  
to renew members for a second term if  they  
had provided sustained public service in their  
first three-year terms. In all, then-Administrator 
Pruitt replaced 21 of  42 members of  the SAB. 
The BOSC has not fared any better. It has been 
so depleted by terminations and resignations that 
it was forced to cancel five subcommittee hearings 
for lack of  membership (Whitehouse 2017). As  
of  October 2018, the BOSC page of  the EPA 
website lists no scheduled meetings (EPA 2018d).
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members representing the public interest (Peter-
son 2017). The Committee has also operated 
largely in secret and with the participation of  
members who appear to violate DOI regulations 
governing conflicts of  interest. This incarnation 
of  the RPC seems to have supplanted the Ex-
tractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) 
Multi-Stakeholder Group advisory committee,  
a committee with a chartered interest in transpar-
ency and a balanced roster of  stakeholders that 
historically included at least four members repre-
senting the public. The EITI met 21 times from 
2013 through 2017, but has been effectively  
suspended since early 2017 (POGO 2017). A 
lawsuit challenging DOI’s formation and mainte-
nance of  the RPC is pending in the District of  
Montana.
 Relatedly, in January 2018, 10 of  12 members 
of  the National Park System Advisory Board  
resigned before their positions were set to expire 
because the department had failed to schedule 
meetings, and they felt their requests to engage 
had been ignored (Eilperin 2018). This commit-
tee is usually composed of  social and natural  
science academics and in the past has advised 
DOI on issues ranging from how to better   
encourage children to visit national parks to how 
the National Park System can mitigate impacts  
of  climate change. 
Department of labor
Similar inactivity was experienced by committee 
members at DOL, specifically at the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). 
Four out of  five of  OSHA’s advisory committees 
failed to meet in 2017, including the National 
Advisory Committee on Occupational Safety  
and Health and the Whistleblower Protection 
Advisory Committee. Though these committees 
are not designated as “science advisory commit-
tees,” the work that they do affects scientists and 
science policy at the agency. At DOL, these com-
mittees are critical because, among other respon-
sibilities, they make recommendations that ad-
vance strong science-based workplace protections 
for construction workers, help sick nuclear plant 
facility workers obtain health benefits, and assist 
in guiding the implementation of  science-based 
safeguards that protect workers from exposure to 
harmful substances like beryllium. Additionally, 
some of  these committees help answer emerging 
questions and provide guidance to strengthen 
compliance with the 22 whistleblower statutes 
administered by OSHA (Jones 2018).
proposeD solutions
As independent and informed science in the  
government remains as crucial as ever, all voices 
must continue to raise the political price of  side-
lining science. Members of  Congress have made 
some strong inquiries throughout the year about 
changes to advisory committees, but could do 
more to protect the science advice structure at  
the federal agencies and to continue to improve 
the transparency and objectivity of  these bodies. 
By enacting the following recommendations, 
Congress can protect against political interfer-
ence, rampant conflicts of  interest, and public 
mistrust. Specific recommendations include:
As independent and informed science  
in the government remains as crucial as 
ever, all voices must continue to raise 
the political price of sidelining science. 
•	 Congress	should	hold	hearings	on	the	status		
of  science advisory committees throughout the 
government to investigate whether they are 
serving the public interest.
•	 Congress	should	hold	hearings	on	the	Govern-
ment Accountability Office investigation under 
way into whether agencies are effectively utiliz-
ing advisory committees and complying with 
FACA, and initiate further investigations as 
needed.
•	 Congress	should	enact	legislation	to	close	loop-
holes in FACA that may diminish the objectivity 
of  science advisory committees. For example, 
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Congress should enact legislation  
to close loopholes in FACA that may  
diminish the objectivity of science  
advisory committees.
to the public that the government will be held  
accountable for making evidence-based decisions 
and protecting the public interest. A review of  
meeting and membership data from 73 science 
advisory committees across several agencies 
found that science advisory committees at the 
Department of  Energy (DOE), DOI, and EPA 
have met less often in 2017 than at any time since 
1997. Additionally, fewer experts serve on science 
advisory committees at DOE, EPA, and the  
Department of  Commerce than at any time since 
1997 (Reed et al. 2018). While politicization of  
advisory committees has occurred in previous 
administrations, what sets recent incidents apart 
are the dramatic process alterations that will  
have significant impacts on membership, the  
dissolution of  committees whose work was not in 
line with the administration’s regulatory agenda, 
and appointments of  conflicted individuals to  
advisory committees that compromise the   
objectivity of  these bodies.
the legislation should extend FACA rules to 
advisory committees organized by federal con-
tractors, not just committees convened directly 
by an agency. In addition, representatives  
and nonvoting members who regularly attend 
meetings should be asked to provide informa-
tion on affiliation and conflicts of  interest.
conclusion
The science advice apparatus is crucial for the 
federal government’s ability to make informed 
decisions on policies that affect our public health 
and safety. The advisors who serve on committees 
lend an objective eye that functions as assurance 
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C h a p t e r  3 
Installing Unqualified and  
Conflicted Government Leaders
C
ongress created federal agencies  to  
carry out important functions, and 
strong leadership is essential to effi- 
cient and effective agency performance. 
Appointees should have the necessary qualifica-
tions to lead their agencies or programs, and 
should be free from conflicts of  interest that 
would prevent them from carrying out the  
agencies’ missions. Some nominees are subject  
to Senate confirmation, but many others are  
appointed without input from Congress. Both 
chambers have a responsibility for overseeing  
appointees’ activities. This section gives examples 
of  unqualified and conflicted appointees and dis-
cusses the possibility of  appointees transitioning 
to civil service positions and outlasting an admin-
istration. We recommend steps Congress can take 
to encourage administrations to select qualified 
appointees who will advance their agencies’  
missions.
unQualifieD appointees
The current administration has filled several  
key cabinet positions with individuals who lack 
the bare minimum of  relevant and appropriate 
qualifications. Elected officials of  different poli-
tical backgrounds may have different preferences 
for appointees, but should agree that a certain 
minimum level of  qualification is essential:  
Appointees should possess the subject-matter 
knowledge and management expertise necessary 
to fulfill their designated roles, and should not 
have demonstrated through words or action  
that they oppose the statutory missions of  the 
agencies they are appointed to lead. Several  
recent political appointees do not meet these 
minimal standards.
environmental protections
Before he was nominated and confirmed as EPA 
administrator, a position from which he has now 
resigned, Scott Pruitt’s LinkedIn page described 
him as “a leading advocate against the EPA’s  
activist agenda” (Davenport and Lipton 2017).  
As Oklahoma’s attorney general, Pruitt sued  
the agency repeatedly to overturn rules to limit 
air pollution from power plants and protect wet-
lands (Mosbergen 2017); as EPA administrator,  
he rolled back regulatory and enforcement activi-
ties designed to protect public health (Popovich, 
Albeck-Ripka, and Pierre-Louis 2018; Lipton and 
Ivory 2017). Contrary to overwhelming evidence, 
he has stated that he is not convinced that carbon 
dioxide from human activity is the main driver  
of  climate change (Chiacu and Volcovici 2017). 
Past EPA administrators have held different  
positions about the extent to which the agency 
should regulate pollutants, but former adminis-
trator Pruitt was unique in his apparent opposition 
to the agency’s very mission of  assuring a healthy 
environment and his unwillingness to accept the 
The current administration has  
filled several key cabinet positions  
with individuals who lack the bare  
minimum of relevant and appropriate 
qualifications. 
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consensus of  the scientific community on one of  
the most pressing environmental issues of  our time.
agricultural science
President Trump nominated Sam Clovis to the 
U.S. Department of  Agriculture’s top science post 
despite his lack of  academic credentials in hard 
science, and despite the Congressional require-
ment to have a qualified scientist fill the position 
(Green 2017). His withdrawal from consideration 
for head of  the agency’s Research, Education and 
Economics division came amidst revelations about 
his links to Russian officials during the presidential 
campaign, rather than in acknowledgment of  his 
lack of  appropriate qualifications (Eilperin 2017b).
family planning
At HHS, the deputy assistant secretary for popu-
lation affairs oversees the Title X family planning 
program—yet the most recent appointees have 
histories of  promoting abstinence over compre-
hensive contraceptive care and advancing claims 
not supported by scientific evidence. Former  
Deputy Assistant Secretary Teresa Manning,  
unsafe (Browne 2016) because this form of  care is 
insufficiently regulated, despite extensive evidence 
of  abortion’s safety and the fact that it is already 
more heavily regulated than other healthcare  
services that carry similar risks (CRHS 2018; 
Jones, Daniel, and Cloud 2018).
 When an administration selects unqualified 
appointees to lead agencies or programs, it hobbles 
agencies’ ability to carry out their Congressionally 
mandated missions and use government resources 
efficiently. The consequences for public health 
and our economy can be severe. Programs that 
safeguard our air and water quality and that  
help low-income individuals access contraception 
allow more people to enjoy good health and par-
ticipate fully in their families, workplaces, and 
communities. Appointees who lack understanding 
or appreciation for how these programs work  
can undo years of  public health accomplish-
ments, such as the recent decline in the teen  
pregnancy rate.
appointees with conflicts  
of interest
Numerous political appointees across the federal 
government, both those who received Senate 
confirmation and those who did not require  
confirmation, have brought with them a variety 
of  conflicts of  interest, including ties to particular 
companies or industry groups. In many cases, 
these officials have either been appointed using  
a special hiring authority that exempts them from 
the Trump Ethics Pledge, or they have simply 
been given a waiver to do work directly related  
to the interests of  their former employers or  
clients. Some appointees also have personal  
financial relationships with lobbyists or companies 
that pose or appear to pose a direct conflict with 
their government duties.
various epa employees
In March 2018, the Associated Press reported 
that, of  59 EPA appointees they tracked over  
the previous year, approximately one-third had 
worked as lobbyists or lawyers for industries regu-
lated by EPA, including chemical manufacturers 
who held the position from May 2017 to January 
2018, previously claimed “contraception doesn’t 
work” (Lanktree 2017), despite extensive evidence 
to the contrary. Her replacement, Deputy Assis-
tant Secretary Diane Foley, previously served as 
executive director of  Education for a Lifetime, 
which promotes abstinence to middle and high 
school students with claims such as “[b]ecoming 
sexually active before marriage makes it harder  
to have a good marriage later” (Lane 2010), despite 
a lack of  credible evidence of  such a causal rela-
tionship. Foley has also suggested that abortion is 
When an administration selects   
unqualified appointees to lead agencies 
or programs, it hobbles agencies’  
ability to carry out their Congressionally 
mandated missions and use government 
resources efficiently.
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and fossil fuel producers (Biesecker, Linderman, 
and Lardner 2018). Although a presidential  
executive order barred appointees who worked  
as registered lobbyists in the two years prior to 
their appointments from participating in matters 
related to their previous work, many of  these  
appointees received ethics waivers to work on 
topics involving their former employers. Others 
appeared to violate the policy and did not receive 
waivers (Biesecker, Linderman, and Lardner 2018). 
 Nancy Beck worked as an executive for the 
chemical industry’s main trade association until 
assuming the position of  deputy assistant admin-
istrator of  EPA’s Office of  Chemical Safety. In 
her current role, she exercises substantial influ-
ence over regulations; staff members told the New 
York Times that Deputy Assistant Administrator 
Beck instructed them to rewrite standards to  
reflect the chemical industry’s preferred changes 
(Lipton 2017). Beck’s position was “administra-
tively determined”—a category that is neither a 
political appointee nor competitively hired civil 
servant, and is typically reserved for technical  
experts rather than managers—and so she was 
not covered by the ethics requirement. A provi-
sion to the Safe Drinking Water Act allows EPA  
to hire up to 30 people without Senate or White 
House approval so that experts can be brought 
on board quickly; instead, former EPA Adminis-
trator Scott Pruitt hired ex-lobbyists and several 
other aides, Beck among them, through this  
provision (Grandoni 2018a). 
 Before his confirmation as EPA deputy admin-
istrator in April 2018, now-Acting Administrator 
Wheeler spent nine years working as a consultant 
and lobbyist for fossil fuel companies (Hirsher 
2018). His client list included coal mining firm 
Murray Energy, which sued EPA over multiple 
regulations, including the Clean Power Plan  
(Restuccia, Guillén, and Adragna 2017).   
Although an agency spokesperson has stated  
that Wheeler consults with EPA ethics officials 
and will recuse himself  when potential conflicts 
arise, it is difficult to imagine how he can perform 
his duties fully while avoiding matters that affect  
his former clients.
secretary of the interior ryan Zinke
When nominated to serve as Secretary of  the  
Interior, Ryan Zinke failed to disclose that he held 
1,000 shares in a private company that manufac-
tures firearms and advanced weapons materials 
(Vardi 2018). Secretary Zinke and his top aides 
met with company executives in April 2017, his 
Before his confirmation as EPA deputy 
administrator in April 2018, now-Acting 
Administrator Andrew Wheeler spent 
nine years working as a consultant  
and lobbyist for fossil fuel companies.
official calendar shows, and Secretary Zinke has 
signed secretarial orders and proposed a rule to 
allow more hunting and gun-carrying on public 
lands (Vardi 2018).  
 Like other senior political appointees, Secre-
tary Zinke has also come under scrutiny for his 
use of  costly flights. DOI’s Office of  Inspector 
General determined that Secretary Zinke followed 
the policies for most of  the chartered and military 
flights he took in FY 2017, but that a $12,357 
charter flight from Las Vegas to Kalispell, Montana, 
likely would not have been approved if  ethics  
officials had received complete information about 
it—namely, that the speech Secretary Zinke gave 
did not mention DOI. Another pertinent detail 
ethics staff lacked was that the speech was delivered 
to a hockey team owned by a donor to Zinke’s 
Congressional campaign (OIG 2018). 
 In July 2018, DOI’s inspector general   
announced an investigation of  a real estate deal  
involving a foundation Zinke established and  
a development team that includes the chair of   
oil services company Halliburton. The deal  
could raise the land value of  properties Secre-
tary Zinke owns in Whitefish, Montana, and one 
of  its major players could benefit substantially 
from decisions Secretary Zinke makes about  
oil and gas development on federal lands   
(Lefebvre 2018).
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former cDc Director brenda fitzgerald
Following her appointment as director of  CDC, 
Brenda Fitzgerald had to recuse herself  from 
multiple matters related to her investments. Seven 
months after assuming her role, she was still  
unable to testify before Congress on issues such as 
the opioid crisis and cancer detection (Haberkorn 
and Ehley 2018). She resigned after reporters  
discovered that she had purchased tobacco stocks 
while working at CDC (Kaplan 2018; Karlin-
Smith and Ehley 2018). Having a director unable 
to participate on key public health issues and then 
facing an abrupt leadership change is challenging 
for any agency; it is especially worrisome when 
the agency in question is charged with responding 
to public health threats such as foodborne illness 
outbreaks and Ebola.
unQualifieD anD conflicteD  
appointees can outlast  
an aDministration
Political appointees can continue to influence  
an agency beyond the term of  the president who 
appointed them if  they obtain a civil service posi-
tion. Appointees can convert to a merit-based  
proposeD solutions
Congress has a responsibility to ensure that fed-
eral agencies are led and staffed by appropriate, 
qualified, and unconflicted nominees. Both  
senators and representatives should make full use 
of  the tools at their disposal to ensure that this 
happens. Specific recommendations include:
•	 The	U.S.	Senate,	through	its	confirmation	
powers, is responsible for ensuring that federal 
agencies are led by qualified, unconflicted  
individuals. When nominees are subject to 
Senate confirmation, senators should use their 
advise and consent powers to vet the back-
grounds of  appointees, and vote against those 
with conflicts of  interest or who demonstrate  
a clear lack of  competence. Some nominees 
have withdrawn their names from consider-
ation after concerns came to light. For example, 
Michael Dourson, who was nominated to 
oversee EPA’s chemical safety division despite  
a long history of  helping companies that use 
toxic compounds fight EPA regulatory efforts 
(Kaplan and Lipton 2017a), withdrew from 
consideration after facing bipartisan opposition 
from senators (Kaplan and Lipton 2017b).
•	 Many	appointees	do	not	require	Senate		
confirmation, and representatives do not  
vote on any nominees, but this does not  
mean Congress lacks influence. Members of  
Congress can raise concerns about unqualified 
and conflicted appointees through oversight 
hearings, requests for information from agency 
heads, and requests for Inspector General 
investigations. Representatives can also use 
subpoena power to investigate conflicts. For  
instance, Representatives Donald Beyer and 
Gerald Connolly requested that EPA’s Inspector 
General investigate the process by which then-
Administrator Pruitt appointed former banker 
Albert Kelly—who had no relevant qualifications 
and had recently been fined by the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation—to lead a  
Superfund task force (Beyer and Connolly 
2018). Days later, Kelly resigned (Lerner 2018). 
Political appointees can continue  
to influence an agency beyond the term 
of the president who appointed them if 
they obtain a civil service position. 
civil service position—a process known as “bur-
rowing”—only if  the Office of  Personnel Man-
agement determines that the agency’s hiring process 
follows merit system requirements. In March 
2018, the House of  Representatives passed H.R. 
1132, the Political Appointee Burrowing Preven-
tion Act (H.R. 1132 2017), which would prohibit 
appointees from obtaining career civil service  
positions for two years after separation from the 
political position; a related bill (S. 2581 2018)  
has been introduced in the Senate and referred  
to the Committee on Homeland Security  
and Governmental Affairs.
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•	 Congress	should	pass	legislation	such	as		
the Executive Branch Comprehensive Ethics 
Enforcement Act (H.R. 5902 2018; S. 2919 
2018) to give the Office of  Government Ethics 
(OGE) enforcement power. Currently, OGE 
can identify violations of  ethics laws and  
regulations but cannot compel compliance. 
The Executive Branch Comprehensive Ethics 
Enforcement Act would empower OGE to  
enforce federal ethics laws and regulations  
and allow it to compile all the relevant ethics 
records. It would grant OGE’s director the 
ability to request subpoenas from a federal 
court to gather necessary information, and 
report OGE findings directly to Congress;  
authorize the agency to order corrective  
actions, such as divestiture or recusal; and  
establish OGE as the central repository for 
ethics records deemed public information by 
law or by the director, and make these records 
available online in a searchable format. 
•	 Congress	should	ensure	that	hiring	authority	
under the Safe Drinking Water Act discour-
ages the hiring of  staff without approval and 
without the same ethics requirements that  
apply to other appointees. 
•	 Congress	should	pass	legislation	such	as	the	
Political Appointee Burrowing Prevention  
Act that limits the conversion of  political  
appointees to career civil servants.
Members of Congress can raise   
concerns about unqualified and   
conflicted appointees through hearings, 
letters to agency heads, and requests 
for Inspector General investigations.
conclusion
For agencies to fulfill their statutory mandates, 
they must have leaders who agree with the  
agency’s mission and are free from conflicts  
of  interest that could compromise confidence  
in their decisions. When administrations install  
appointees who lack these basic qualifications, 
agency performance and public trust suffer— 
with potentially grave consequences for public 
health and the environment. Congress should  
use its oversight power to raise concerns about 
unqualified and conflicted nominees; develop 
stronger mechanisms for monitoring recusals  
and ethics waivers; and close the loopholes that 
make it easier for unqualified and conflicted  
appointees to gain and keep influential positions 
at federal agencies. 
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C h a p t e r  4 
Reduced Communications  
from Scientific Agencies
O
ne of  the most important functions  
of  scientific agencies1 is to communi-
cate the results of  scientific research to 
the public and Congress in an accurate 
and timely manner. In some cases, reports  to 
Congress and the public are required by law. 
However, political appointees are increasingly 
censoring and suppressing scientific information, 
as well as deterring federal scientists from com-
municating openly with the public and the press. 
Such ideologically motivated constraints leave  
the public without important information regard-
ing threats to public health and safety. Moreover, 
suppression of  science can lead to poor policy-
making when policymakers are unable to access 
the ability of  legislators, regulators, the media, 
and the public to access to scientific information.
censorship of scientific research
Censoring scientific research results in decision-
makers and the public having less information 
about hazards that could affect their health and 
well-being. Some particularly troubling examples 
of  such censorship that have come to light involve 
chemical hazards and climate change.
the white house blocks atsDr study  
addressing the toxicity of common pollutants
In May 2018, emails uncovered through the  
Freedom of  Information Act revealed that Trump 
administration officials sought to block publica-
tion of  a draft toxicological profile examining the 
health risks associated with exposure to per- and 
polyfluoroalkyl substances (PFAS) because the 
report would be a “public relations nightmare” 
(Snider 2018). PFAS are synthetic chemicals 
found in everything from nonstick cookware  
to firefighting foam and are highly persistent in 
the environment and human body (EPA 2018e). 
According to the emails, the profile, created by 
the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease 
Registry (ATSDR), found that these chemicals 
pose health risks at levels far lower than those 
EPA had previously deemed safe (Snider 2018). 
Significant bipartisan Congressional pressure  
followed public exposure of  this suppression, and 
the report was released in June 2018. This study 
indeed found that the risk levels for PFAS are  
7 to 10 times lower than EPA’s current standards 
Political appointees are increasingly  
censoring and suppressing scientific  
information, as well as deterring federal 
scientists from communicating openly 
with the public and the press.
the best available scientific information. This  
section discusses instances in which federal depart-
ments and agencies have deliberately censored or 
suppressed the normal flow of  communications 
associated with scientific research. We recom-
mend remedies to ensure our nation continues to 
benefit from dissemination of  taxpayer-supported 
research.
 The following examples highlight some of  the 
most concerning developments that have limited 
1 “Scientific agencies” refers to agencies that engage in generating and/or using scientific research.
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(ATSDR 2018). Shortly before ATSDR released 
the report, EPA held a summit to discuss PFAS, 
but excluded most journalists and community 
groups (Wallace 2018). 
nps attempts to remove references  
to human-caused climate change
A study commissioned by the National Park  
Service (NPS) to assess the potential effects of   
sea level rise on national parks located in coastal 
areas drew the attention of  NPS employees who 
attempted to remove references in the report to 
human-caused climate change (Shogren 2018a). 
The author, Maria Caffrey, a paleoclimatologist 
at the University of  Colorado, fought to retain 
the language (Shogren 2018b). Following a Reveal 
news story about the issue and requests from 
members of  Congress for an Inspector General 
investigation (Shogren 2018a; Shogren 2018c), 
the final report was issued with references to  
human-caused climate change included  
(Shogren 2018a).
removal of publicly available 
scientific information on climate 
change
In multiple instances, agencies have removed  
previously available climate-change content from 
the public domain. These deletions deprive the 
public of  access to taxpayer-supported scientific 
information and represent a failure on the part  
of  these agencies to fulfill their duty to keep the 
public informed about threats to our health.
fema removes climate change  
from its strategic plan
The Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), the federal government entity respon-
sible for responding to natural disasters such as 
floods and hurricanes, eliminated mentions of  
climate change from its strategic planning docu-
ment for 2018–2022 (Flavelle 2018a). The new 
strategic planning document acknowledges that 
there is a “rising natural hazard risk,” but does 
not mention that climate change is expected to 
exacerbate that risk (FEMA 2018). This contrasts 
sharply with FEMA’s last strategic plan, which 
not only made explicit mention of  climate change 
but required any state seeking funding for disaster 
preparedness to assess the threat posed by climate 
change (Gustin 2018).
On December 20, 2017, NPS  
removed 92 documents describing  
climate action plans for various  
national parks from its website.
nps Deletes Documents relating to climate 
change from its website
On December 20, 2017, NPS removed 92 docu-
ments describing climate action plans for various 
national parks from its website (Bergman, Gehrke, 
and Rinberg 2017a). Those documents contained 
information about how certain national parks are 
responding to climate change. NPS said at the 
time that the documents with information about 
climate change had been removed for compliance 
reasons, and would be put back up by January 18, 
2018 (Rinberg et al. 2017). As of  this writing, 
however, several of  the links to the climate action 
plans for member parks either still did not work 
or came up with old versions. As a result, regional 
park managers do not have access to current  
resources that would help them address the effects 
of  climate change on their parks and ensure 
 sustainable operations, and the public no longer 
has access to valuable information about the  
environmental changes affecting their   
communities. 
epa website relaunches without  
scientific materials
In April 2017, EPA removed the “Climate and 
Energy Resources for State, Local, and Tribal 
Governments” section from its website. Three 
months later, EPA relaunched the website as  
“Energy Resources for State, Local, and Tribal 
Governments,” without the reference to climate. 
The new site deleted references to climate change 
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and removed multiple links to materials aimed at 
helping local officials prepare for climate change 
impacts (Bergman, Gehrke, and Rinberg 2017b). 
This action directly harms the ability of  state,  
local, and tribal governments to access science-
based information about climate change and to 
respond to it in an effective and timely way in  
order to protect their citizens. 
scheduled to attend the International Atomic  
Energy Agency Conference were told they could 
no longer do so (Negin 2017). In October 2017, 
Scientific American reported that William Jolly, a  
research ecologist with the Forest Service, was 
denied approval to attend a conference where  
he was scheduled to give a presentation about  
the role of  climate change in wildfire conditions 
(Patterson 2017). A few months later, DOI more 
than halved the number of  U.S. Geological  
Survey (USGS) scientists allowed to attend the 
annual meeting of  the American Geophysical 
Union (Kaplan 2017). Then on May 3, 2018, the 
Washington Post reported that the Bureau of  Land 
Management (BLM) blocked at least 14 employees, 
including archaeologists, from attending the annual 
meeting of  the Society for American Archaeology, 
a major scientific conference. The BLM archae-
ologists were scheduled to give a presentation at  
a symposium on “Tough Issues in Land Manage-
ment Archaeology,” but that symposium had to 
be cancelled because the BLM scientists could 
not participate (Grandoni 2018b).
 Cancelling federal scientists’ speaking engage-
ments at the last minute or preventing scientists 
from attending conferences entirely is deeply con-
cerning for several reasons. First, these examples 
seem to be politically motivated attempts to silence 
scientific discussion around climate change or 
other issues agency leadership considers conten-
tious. More broadly, attending and presenting  
at professional conferences is fundamental to  
the development of  scientists’ careers and to the 
furtherance of  their research. Such gatherings 
provide crucial opportunities to share ideas and 
learn about the latest developments in the field, 
as well as to network and develop relationships.  
If  government scientists are deprived of  these 
opportunities, not only will government research 
suffer, but talented researchers will see this as a 
reason not to pursue a career in government. 
new restrictions on scientist communications 
through public affairs policies
In order for decision-makers to have the best  
scientific information available, federal agencies 
In October 2017 EPA barred three  
EPA researchers from giving planned 
presentations on climate change at   
a conference in Rhode Island about  
the health of Narragansett Bay.
preventing scientists from  
attenDing anD presenting at  
scientific conferences
Restricting scientists’ ability to communicate  
with their scientific peers and members of  the 
press limits the flow of  knowledge and can  
damage agencies’ ability to attract and retain  
staff with valuable expertise.
blocking scientists from attending and  
presenting at scientific conferences
Several federal agency scientists have seen their 
speaking engagements cancelled, particularly at 
professional scientific conferences. For example,  
in October 2017 EPA at the last minute barred 
three EPA researchers from giving planned  
presentations on climate change at a conference 
in Rhode Island about the health of  Narragansett 
Bay. The scientists who were prevented from 
speaking, one of  whom was slated to give the  
keynote address, made substantial contributions 
to a 400-page report on the subject (Friedman 
2017). A few months later, EPA did something 
similar when it prevented 17 agency staffers from 
attending the Alaska Forum on the Environment, 
a conference that focuses on climate-related  
issues (Flavelle and Dloughy 2017). 
 This problem is not limited to EPA. In April 
2017, at least 27 DOE scientists who were   
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must allow their scientists to speak freely to the 
media about their research. Increasingly, how-
ever, agencies are attempting to use restrictive 
public affairs or public relations policies to  
control the information their scientists can  
communicate.
 On May 3, 2017, Lance Leggitt, then-chief   
of  staff for HHS, sent a memorandum to em-
ployees mandating that communications with 
members of  Congress and staff could not occur 
without prior consultation with the Office of  the 
Assistant Secretary for Legislation (Leggitt 2017). 
CDC took similar action on August 31, 2017, 
when a public affairs officer sent an email to 
CDC employees informing them that they were 
no longer allowed to correspond in any way with 
the news media without prior approval from 
CDC’s Atlanta Communications Office (Baker 
2017). At the USGS, a new policy required  
scientists to get permission before speaking to  
reporters about science (Lin 2018). After report-
ers linked to the policy, it was removed from its 
previous location and buried deep in the website 
of  DOI, USGS’s parent agency (Halpern 2018).
 Prompted by a complaint from the Govern-
ment Accountability Project, the Office of  Special 
Counsel (OSC) conducted an investigation into 
whether the incidents at HHS and CDC violated 
5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(13) of  the Whistleblower Pro-
tection Act, which prohibits the implementation 
or enforcement of  a non-disclosure policy that 
would gag employees from exercising their rights 
to raise concern about agency operations (Giaccio 
2018a). OSC found that there was no violation 
because HHS later took “full corrective action” 
by informing agency employees of  their rights  
to communicate with Congress and to make  
disclosures without agency clearance (Giaccio 
2018a). However, this kind of  post-hoc remedy—
informing employees of  their rights after senior 
management has issued repeated directives to 
employees not to exercise those rights—is hardly 
adequate to undo the chilling effect on employee 
communication.2
 For political appointees to attempt to control 
what agency scientists share about their scientific 
research and knowledge is extremely troubling. 
Agency scientific integrity policies generally  
emphasize the importance of  scientists being able 
to communicate with the press and with the pub-
lic about their work. These new restrictions on 
communications at agencies represent a flagrant 
violation of  both the letter and the spirit of  those 
scientific integrity policies. Agency public affairs 
officials are increasingly acting as gatekeepers 
and campaigners, not as facilitators of  infor-
mation flow. This pattern reduces government 
accountability and robs states, journalists, and  
the public of  access to scientific expertise. 
impacts
Breakdowns in federal agency communication  
of  scientific information have myriad negative 
consequences. First, state, local, and tribal govern-
ments—as well as federal agencies charged with 
protecting public health and safety and managing 
shared resources or hazards—require access to 
scientific data and information they can use to 
develop policies and plan for the future. When 
agencies like CDC remove information from their 
websites or prevent their scientists from commu-
nicating with the public, it becomes harder for 
2 Similar directives aimed at barring employees from speaking with Congress or the press have been issued recently, including  
from the Department of  Agriculture, DOI, EPA, the Department of  Transportation, and DOJ. Even if  the directives have been 
subsequently “remedied” by informing employees that gag orders do not supersede their whistleblower rights or rights to communi-
cate with Congress, the initial message is clear: senior agency management will be hostile to employees who communicate without 
prior approval. See Shelbourne 2017; Lartey 2017; Giaccio 2018b.
Agency scientific integrity policies  
generally emphasize the importance of 
scientists being able to communicate 
with the press and with the public  
about their work in order to maintain  
scientific integrity.
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government at every level to understand, plan for, 
and mitigate public health risks, environmental 
dangers, and safety threats.
 When agencies fail to communicate about  
science it also means that the public itself  has  
less direct access to science and evidence-based 
information. This, too, negatively affects public 
or regulation, gross mismanagement, gross waste 
of  funds, abuse of  authority, dangers to public 
health and safety, or scientific censorship that 
would result in these forms of  misconduct. Such 
practices foster opacity rather than the transpar-
ency that is essential to an accountable, responsive 
democracy. 
proposeD solutions
Despite the importance of  open and informative 
agency communications, current practices and 
legal structures often leave agency employees who 
become aware of  censorship or suppression of  
scientific information few effective mechanisms 
for correcting such situations. Congress should 
take several actions to ensure that agencies both 
communicate scientific information and develop-
ments appropriately and allow their scientists  
to do so as well. 
encourage agencies to strengthen  
scientific integrity policies
In response to a presidential memorandum issued 
by President Obama in 2009, many scientific 
agencies have developed scientific integrity policies 
explicitly stating that open communication of  the 
results of  scientific studies, freedom from censor-
ship, the ability to communicate with the press, 
and the ability to freely participate in professional 
activities such as presenting at conferences are  
all integral parts of  scientific integrity (Goldman 
et al. 2017).
 While the scientific integrity policies are sound 
in concept, they are generally difficult to use or 
enforce to correct the kinds of  communication 
failures described above because they typically 
provide few specific procedural requirements 
(e.g., failing to specify whether complainants are 
entitled to a hearing or an appeal). Likewise, ex-
isting scientific integrity policies are largely silent 
with respect to specific enforcement mechanisms 
and do not obligate agencies to take any par- 
ticular action if  they do find a violation. 
 Members of  Congress should put  
public pressure on agencies, by way of  
letters, hearings, and other oversight 
Censorship and chilled communication 
undermine accountability by weakening 
Congress’s ability to engage in oversight 
of the executive branch and to ensure 
that federal agencies are fulfilling their 
public missions. 
health. For example, if  agency scientists conduct 
research that determines that air or water pollut-
ants pose health risks in certain communities, but 
the agency fails to communicate that information  
to the public, citizens in those communities may 
experience preventable harm. 
 In addition to these direct negative impacts  
on public health and good governance, agencies’ 
failure to communicate freely about science  
creates a culture in which scientists self-censor. 
Scientists may not pursue research projects on 
topics that are important but disfavored by political 
appointees, because there is an explicit or implicit 
message that they are not welcome. The result  
is that science becomes politicized, the entire  
scientific endeavor suffers, and both the public 
and governmental entities are deprived of  im-
portant new scientific data and information  
that could be used in policymaking.
 Finally, censorship and chilled communication 
undermine accountability by weakening Con-
gress’s ability to engage in oversight of  the execu-
tive branch and to ensure that federal agencies 
are fulfilling their public missions. Censorship can 
occur both through suppression or removal and 
by creating a culture where employees are afraid 
to exercise their rights to report information they 
reasonably believe evidences a violation of  law  
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measures, to expand and strengthen  
their scientific integrity policies to incor-
porate specific procedural protections 
and enforcement mechanisms. This would 
make these policies a more effective means of  
addressing and correcting violations in a timely 
manner.
strengthen and pass the scientific  
integrity act
In addition to using its oversight authority to  
encourage agencies to strengthen the scientific 
integrity policies described in the 2009 presiden-
tial memorandum, Congress could address these 
issues legislatively. Indeed, in early 2017 mem-
bers of  both the House and Senate introduced  
a Scientific Integrity Act that would codify  
the requirement that scientific agencies develop 
scientific integrity policies. Passing the Scientific 
Integrity Act would help to ensure that all   
scientific agencies have strong scientific integrity 
policies that protect both research and research-
ers. In passing the Scientific Integrity Act, Con-
gress should go even further than the initial bill 
did. Congress should strengthen it by adding  
requirements that agencies develop scientific  
integrity policies that explicitly make attempts  
at censoring scientists a violation of  scientific  
integrity. Furthermore, Congress should require 
agencies to develop more specific enforcement 
procedures and other procedural protections  
for scientists who allege a scientific integrity  
violation, such as the right to a hearing and  
an explicit right to appeal to a federal court.
 These kinds of  statutory protections would  
go a long way toward preventing the deeply 
problematic censorship of  communication from 
agency scientists about their work discussed in 
this chapter. Congress should strengthen 
and pass the Scientific Integrity Act.
Passing the Scientific Integrity Act  
would help to ensure that all scientific 
agencies have strong scientific integrity 
policies that protect both research  
and researchers.
strengthen whistleblower statutes
A patchwork of  laws provides protections to  
federal employees who blow the whistle on  
certain kinds of  unethical or illegal behavior 
within the federal government. However, existing  
whistleblower laws do not currently provide much, 
if  any, explicit protection for federal employees 
blowing the whistle on the kinds of  reduced com-
munications about science discussed in this chapter.
 Congress should strengthen and   
expand whistleblower statutes to provide 
explicit protections for federal employees 
blowing the whistle on censorship and 
suppression of  science—regardless of  
whether it constitutes waste, fraud, or 
abuse. The next chapter will cover whistleblower 
laws, including proposed solutions to loopholes  
in the whistleblower laws, in detail.
conclusion
It is crucial for public health, the environment, 
good governance, and the health of  the scientific 
endeavor in the United States that our federal 
agencies foster and conduct complete, accurate, 
and timely communication of  scientific infor-
mation. However, as the examples in this chapter 
illustrate, multiple agencies are failing to carry 
out this responsibility in deeply troubling ways. 
With the actions described above, members of  
Congress can help ensure that federal agencies 
communicate effectively with the public about 
science.
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C h a p t e r  5 
Whistleblowing and  
Scientific Integrity
W
histleblowers—employees who  
report information they reasonably 
believe evidences illegality; gross 
mismanagement or waste of  funds; 
abuse of  authority; substantial dangers to public 
health, safety, or the environment; or scientific 
censorship that would result in such harm— 
have repeatedly been one of  the most powerful 
vehicles for ensuring adherence not only to law 
and policy, but to the mission of  our federal  
agencies. Congressional representatives should 
ensure that science, and science-based policy, are 
safeguarded by protecting the rights of  federal  
employees to speak out about serious abuses  
of  public trust. This section highlights the im- 
portance of  whistleblowing in federal scientific 
agencies3 and offers prescriptive policy goals that 
Congress should consider enacting to strengthen 
and expand whistleblower protection rights for 
employees.
 
whistleblowing: rights anD  
risks for employees
Under the Whistleblower Protection Act of   
1989 (WPA 1989), amended by the Whistleblower 
Protection Enhancement Act of  2012 (WPEA 
2012), most federal employees who work in the 
science agencies have the right to disclose infor-
mation, free from reprisal, that they reasonably 
believe evidences a violation of  law, rule, or  
regulation; gross mismanagement; a gross waste 
of  funds; abuse of  authority; a substantial and 
specific danger to public health or safety; or cen-
sorship of  their research. These and other laws 
provide federal employees with well-established, 
though imperfect, rights to disclose serious abuses 
of  public trust either internally (e.g., to managers, 
agency Inspectors General, co-workers) or exter-
nally (e.g., to OSC, members of  Congress). If  the 
information is not classified or its release specifi-
cally barred by statute, they have public freedom 
of  expression with audiences like the media, 
watchdog organizations, and citizen groups.  
Under the WPA, whistleblowers can also “walk 
the talk” by refusing to violate the law.  
  Legal rights for U.S. private employees,  includ-
ing many contractors who perform scientific work 
for the federal government, are more complicated. 
More than 50 corporate whistleblower protection 
laws exist at the federal level, along with many 
state and local laws (Devine and Maassarani 
2011). Each law protects, in certain cases, the  
legal rights of  employees to report wrongdoing 
free from reprisal and has different procedural 
steps and different paths for enforcement.   
Most employees stay silent in the  
face of witnessing misconduct because 
they fear reprisal or believe that   
speaking up will not make a difference. 
In a survey of corporate employees  
who do speak up, 97% report concerns 
internally first, variously to supervisors, 
higher management, ethics officers,  
and hotlines.
3 “Scientific agencies” refers to agencies that engage in generating and/or using scientific research.
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Assessing the content of  the whistleblowing dis-
closure, to whom the disclosure was made, and 
what kind of  reprisal was suffered by the whistle-
blower are all moving variables (Gold 2013).4
 Most employees remain silent after witnessing 
misconduct because they fear reprisal or believe 
that speaking up will not make a difference. In a 
survey of  corporate employees who do speak up, 
97% report concerns internally first, variously  
to supervisors, higher management, ethics officers, 
and hotlines (ERC 2012). Only when employees 
are ignored or face reprisal do they consider  
reporting problems externally to Congress, jour-
nalists, or non-profit watchdog organizations.
 Reprisal for whistleblowing unfortunately is 
real, despite the fact that whistleblowers are often 
the best, and sometimes the only, pathway toward 
holding government institutions accountable,  
ensuring regulatory compliance, and protecting 
the public’s interest. Because it is so important to 
encourage employees to report wrongdoing, even 
in the most partisan periods of  Congressional 
history, whistleblower protection has consistently 
garnered unanimous, bipartisan support. Whis-
tleblowers can be unique resources for government 
accountability, transparency, and democracy. In 
essence, whistleblowing is when dedicated public 
employees with insider knowledge exercise the 
freedom to warn of  illegality or corruption within 
their workplaces. With their expert knowledge, 
whistleblowers often catalyze Congressional  
oversight hearings or serve as valuable advisors  
in creating effective policy.
eXamples of science-relateD  
whistleblowing
From revealing gross waste of  government funds 
to reporting on deadly construction flaws in 
American nuclear plants, federal employees  
at scientific agencies have a long tradition of   
whistleblowing. Multiple administrations have 
retaliated against these whistleblowers, which  
can chill employees from communicating with 
Congress and the public and thereby hamper  
accountability. The case studies below not only 
exemplify the wide variety of  issues that whistle-
blowers might address, but illustrate the impor-
tance of  whistleblowers in revealing serious  
threats to the public interest. 
 
2 Perhaps the most common misperception about whistleblowing is that it means leaking “classified” information. Disclosing classified 
information to those without the sufficient security clearance is unprotected, because it is a federal crime and is therefore not protected 
whistleblowing. Unfortunately, the aggressive prosecution of  intelligence community (IC) employees who release classified information 
has fueled the misbelief  that all whistleblowing is criminal. This creates a dangerous “chilling effect” on federal employees’ legal right 
to expose wrongdoing. There are lawful mechanisms for IC employees to report wrongdoing through internal channels, but they  
are weak and ineffectual. Because employees fear their whistleblowing will be ignored by protected channels, some choose to risk 
criminal prosecution by releasing classified information externally. The overwhelming majority of  whistleblowers are outside the 
intelligence community and classification is no issue. But many intelligence and security agencies do rely heavily on science for their 
missions. Although this chapter focuses primarily on non-IC employees in the science agencies, Congress should work to strengthen 
channels through which IC employees may legally blow the whistle. That would strengthen national security by limiting classified  
“leaks” while allowing the IC Inspector General to properly investigate whistleblower concerns. 
Reprisal for whistleblowing  
unfortunately is real, despite the  
fact that whistleblowers are often the 
best, and sometimes the only, pathway 
toward holding government institutions 
accountable, ensuring regulatory  
compliance, and protecting the  
public’s interest. 
miguel Del toral
In June 2015, Del Toral, a manager for EPA’s 
Midwest water division, wrote to EPA leadership 
detailing months of  study by EPA on Flint,  
Michigan’s water quality. Specifically, his memo 
rebuked the Michigan Department of  Environ-
mental Quality’s (MDEQ) decision to change  
the city of  Flint’s water source to the Flint River 
without subsequent corrosion control of  the  
piping, and noted the high lead levels in Flint  
resident LeeAnne Walters’ drinking water   
(Del Toral 2015).
 Del Toral’s warning was ignored for weeks  
at the highest levels of  EPA’s leadership. In July 
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2015 Del Toral shared his memo with Walters, 
who subsequently passed it to ACLU leaders, 
prompting the whirlwind of  public inquiry  
into Flint’s water quality. 
post to an accounting job collecting mineral  
royalty checks (Clement 2017). Clement was one 
of  dozens of  senior DOI officials reassigned in 
mid-2017 with little explanation (Eilperin and Rein 
2017). One-third of  those reassigned were Native 
American, despite Native Americans making  
up less than 10% of  DOI’s workforce (Ollstein 
2018). Secretary of  the Interior Ryan Zinke had 
previously testified about his intent to use reassign-
ments to eliminate employees (Clement 2017).
 In July 2017, Clement filed a whistleblower 
retaliation complaint with OSC. The Inspector 
General’s Office determined that DOI leadership 
did not consistently apply the reasons it stated for 
reassignments, nor did it gather adequate infor-
mation to make informed reassignment decisions 
(Barry 2018). Clement since has left the federal 
government and become a public advocate  
for governmental accountability and scientific 
integrity (Barry 2018).
lawrence criscione
Criscione, a highly credentialed engineer and risk 
analyst with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC), experienced retaliation for raising serious 
concerns regarding the possibility of  major acci-
dents at a quarter of  the nation’s aging nuclear  
power plants if  upstream dams fail and cause  
severe flooding. As the world’s climate changes 
and parts of  the United States experience severe 
storms and record-breaking rainfall, nuclear  
facilities face a growing risk of  cascading fail- 
ures leading to core meltdown, explosions,  
and the release of  highly radioactive material  
(Polansky 2018). 
 Duke Energy’s Oconee Nuclear Station in 
South Carolina has been of  particular concern  
to Criscione, who became increasingly frustrated 
as his superiors ignored his repeated warnings. 
He alerted the NRC Chair and sent a detailed 
email (Criscione 2012) marked confidential to 
Congressional staff. This email was later leaked 
to the press (Zeller 2012). Instead of  addressing 
Criscione’s risk assessment warnings, the NRC’s 
Office of  Inspector General opened an investi-
gation into Criscione for distributing sensitive  
information, even though it was his right to  
Flint’s nearly 100,000 residents   
were exposed to unsafe levels of lead 
contamination, a state of emergency 
was declared, and a Legionnaires’  
disease outbreak linked to the water 
supply changes killed 10 people.
 In retaliation, Del Toral, despite not personally 
sharing the document with the ACLU, was initially 
labeled as a “rogue employee” by MDEQ and 
alleged that he was barred from participating in 
outside meetings in reprisal for raising warnings 
about Flint’s water quality (Delaney 2016). 
 During this long period, Flint’s nearly 100,000 
residents were exposed to unsafe levels of  lead 
contamination, a state of  emergency was declared, 
and a Legionnaires’ disease outbreak linked to the 
water supply changes killed 10 people (Difazio 
2018; Zahran et al. 2018; Southall 2016). Further-
more, 15 state officials received criminal indictments 
(Ganim 2017). Today, scientists do not believe the 
water is safe for Flint residents to drink (Baptiste 
2018). With greater whistleblower protections that 
would have required further investigation of  Del 
Toral’s legitimate concerns, it is likely that the  
impact of  the Flint water crisis could have been 
lessened (Smith 2016).
Joel clement
Clement is a biologist who served as director of  
the Office of  Policy Analysis at DOI and worked 
as a top-level policy advisor for multiple presiden-
tial administrations. While at DOI, Clement—
who spent nearly seven years at the Department—
led a team studying the impacts of  climate change 
upon Alaska Native communities. Yet, after 
speaking publicly about the dangers climate 
change poses for these remote communities, 
Clement was reassigned from his senior executive 
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communicate with Congress under the Lloyd- 
La Follette Act of  1912 and civil service law  
(Lochbaum 2017). The IG sought federal pros-
ecution by referring the case to a U.S. Attorney, 
who rejected it for lack of  merit. Although 
Criscione has been able to keep his job at the 
NRC and is no longer under investigation, his 
concerns have not been fully addressed (OSC 
2017). He reports ongoing barriers such as being 
prohibited from attending meetings regarding 
nuclear plants’ flood risk and being denied access 
to relevant documents. Meanwhile, severe hur-
ricanes and storms are flooding areas where these 
aging nuclear power plants are located, raising 
the risk of  a U.S. nuclear accident worse than  
Fukushima. Criscione has filed formal whistle-
blower retaliation complaints with OSC (GAP 
2015; Lawrence Criscione v. US Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission 2011) and DOL. As of  late 2018,  
his cases are still pending.
kevin chmielewski
Chmielewski was the most prominent whistle-
blower who revealed alleged grossly wasteful 
spending and unethical abuses of  power by then-
EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt, demonstrating 
that employees can help protect scientific integrity 
even if  their direct involvement with science  
is limited. Chmielewski, a former campaign  
aide to President Trump who served as Deputy 
Chief  of  Staff of  Operations at EPA, revealed 
excessive and often illegal spending on security 
and travel, as well as serious ethics conflicts. 
Chmielewski’s disclosures catalyzed Congressio-
nal investigations into then-Administrator Pruitt’s 
unjustified misuse of  public funds (Carper et al. 
2018). Administrator Pruitt ultimately had to  
resign in July 2018 (Davenport, Friedman, and 
Haberman 2018). However, Chmielewski and 
several others who questioned then-Administrator 
Pruitt’s management practices were reassigned, 
demoted, put on administrative leave without  
pay, or fired (Lipton, Vogel, and Friedman 2018).
proposeD solutions
Employees who blow the whistle often suffer a 
real professional cost. Stronger whistleblower  
protection laws would encourage future employees 
to report serious issues of  public concern as well 
as deter reprisals. Below are four recommen- 
dations to strengthen protections for federal  
employee whistleblowers, thus encouraging civil 
servants to report scientific censorship and other 
serious abuses while discouraging retaliation. 
access to court with Jury trials
Access to jury trials would give government  
whistleblowers the same legitimate speech rights 
available to corporate employees through the 
right to seek justice from the citizens whom they 
aim to defend. Federal whistleblowers are the 
only significant portion of  the U.S. labor force 
without that access to justice. Their due process 
rights currently are limited to administrative 
hearings at the Merit Systems Protection Board 
(MSPB). The MSPB does not have independence 
from political pressure or the resources to address 
abuses of  power connected with national policy 
issues, but those disputes are the most significant 
reason we need whistleblowers. The MSPB was 
The Merit Systems Protection Board  
was designed to resolve office conflicts, 
not analyze and reach decisions on  
highly technical, scientific disputes  
of national significance with expert  
testimony. 
designed to resolve office conflicts, not analyze 
and reach decisions on highly technical, scientific 
disputes of  national significance with expert testi-
mony. Providing federal employee whistleblowers 
with access to federal court and trial by jury, like 
all state and local government workers and nearly  
all corporate employee whistleblowers, would 
overcome these weaknesses. Court access also 
would bypass the retaliation whistleblowers often 
face from administrative judges and hearing  
officers in the merit system, who traditionally 
have been exceedingly hostile to those challeng-
ing the executive branch power structure. 
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protection from retaliatory investigations  
that can become criminal prosecutions 
Congress should eliminate loopholes that allow 
managers to conduct some of  the most egregious 
forms of  reprisal levied against whistleblowers—
retaliatory criminal investigations, prosecutorial 
referrals, and prosecutions. Currently, there is  
no need for those wishing to retaliate against 
whistleblowers to propose official personnel  
actions that trigger draining, time-consuming  
due process hearings and appellate review.  
Instead, federal scientific agencies increasingly  
use “whistleblower witch hunts” to bully whistle-
blowers with the threat of  criminal prosecution. 
Furthermore, instead of  facing a loss in a case 
where they cannot find compromising informa-
tion about the whistleblower, they simply close  
the first case and start a new one. Deeming these 
particularly nefarious forms of  retaliation to be 
During these lengthy delays, whistleblowers  
generally are unemployed, pay exorbitant fees  
for legal representation, and have difficulty find-
ing a new job. All the while, they must also worry 
about their personal lives, which may include 
supporting a family and raising children. By the 
time they win their cases, their lives may have 
been irreparably harmed. The current law is  
set up so that OSC can apply interim relief  for 
whistleblowers quite easily, yet the agency seldom 
does except in the most extreme of  cases. The 
legal burdens of  proof  are unrealistically high  
for employees seeking interim relief  on their  
own. Congress should amend the WPA to  
provide realistic legal tests for whistleblowers to 
freeze retaliation until their cases are resolved.  
This not only would be humane; it would also  
make a tremendous difference in the willingness  
of  whistleblowers to work with the court and  
investigators.
conclusion
Employees who speak out about violations of  law, 
gross waste, mismanagement, abuse of  authority, 
and substantial risks to health, safety, and the  
environment are our best resource to hold federal 
agencies accountable and protect the public inter-
est. Expanded protections are essential to ensure 
that employees are encouraged to blow the whistle 
rather than remain silent observers of  abuse.  
Federal scientists in particular work on issues that 
have major impacts to public health and safety, 
from nuclear waste storage to clean drinking  
water. The work of  these individuals is invaluable—
as is their continued vigilance. It is therefore  
imperative that Congress act swiftly and decisively 
to implement robust protections for scientist  
whistleblowers.
Federal scientific agencies increasingly 
use “whistleblower witch hunts” to  
bully whistleblowers with the threat  
of criminal prosecution.
prohibited personnel practices when taken against 
whistleblowers would allow them to defend them-
selves, significantly reducing the intended chilling 
effect on employees who witness serious problems 
in the workplace.
realistic opportunities for whistleblower 
interim relief 
Whistleblower cases brought under the Whistle-
blower Protection Act often take anywhere from  
2 to 12 years for OSC, the MSPB, and relevant 
appellate courts to reach a decision (GAP 2018). 
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C h a p t e r  6 
A Low-Information Approach  
to Enforcement
C
ongress relies on federal agencies to  
enforce the laws it passes, and consis-
tent enforcement can benefit public 
health and the economy. To enforce 
laws fairly, regulatory agencies must have   
accurate, up-to-date information, and levy  
appropriate penalties when evidence shows  
a company has violated federal law. Yet some 
agencies appear to be taking a low-information 
approach to enforcement: They are both weak-
ening measures that would allow them to collect 
appropriate information about compliance  
and ignoring information they have, adopting 
seemingly willful blindness to violations. 
epa Declines to look critically  
at pollution levels relative   
to stanDarDs
Under the Clean Air Act, the New Source  
Review (NSR) program requires power plants 
and refineries to install modern pollution control 
equipment when they are undergoing modifi-
cations that will lead to a significant increase in 
emissions—e.g., if  a power plant is undertaking 
upgrades that will increase its output and, con-
sequently, the pollution it emits. EPA has the  
opportunity to review draft NSR construction 
permits for facilities undertaking upgrades, and 
in the past has examined the appropriateness of  
analyses performed by plant owners and opera-
tors to determine whether plant upgrades will 
increase emissions and trigger pollution-control 
requirements or whether additional emissions 
controls are needed (GAO 2012; United States v. 
DTE Energy Co. 2017). In December 2017, then-
EPA Administrator Scott Pruitt issued a guidance 
memo stating that the agency “does not intend  
to substitute its judgment for that of  the owner  
or operator by ‘second guessing’ the owner or  
operator’s emissions projections” (Pruitt 2017b).
 The “second guessing” language refers to  
a court decision in which the majority opinion 
cautioned EPA against “second guessing” an 
owner’s projection, though the judges did not 
agree on the extent to which skepticism is allowed, 
and a later federal appeals court decision found 
that “the focus on so-called ‘second-guessing’  
is misplaced” (United States v. DTE Energy 2017). 
The memo takes avoidance of  second-guessing  
to  extreme, stating that when “a source owner  
or operator performs a pre-project NSR applica-
bility analysis in accordance with the calcula- 
tion procedures in the regulations, and follows  
the applicable recordkeeping and notification  
requirements in the regulations, that owner or 
operator has met the pre-project source obliga-
tions of  the regulations, unless there is a clear  
error (e.g., the sources applies the wrong signifi-
cance threshold)” (Pruitt 2017b). By suggesting 
Some agencies appear to be   
taking a low-information approach to  
enforcement: They are both weakening  
measures that would allow them to  
collect appropriate information about 
compliance and ignoring information 
they have, adopting seemingly  
willful blindness to violations. 
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that EPA will remove itself  from the determina-
tion except in cases with the most obvious of   
errors, the agency is practically inviting unscrupu-
lous operators preparing analyses to make the 
kinds of  assumptions that are least likely to  
show the need for them to invest in additional 
pollution-control equipment.
to postpone, for up to three years or more,  
the deadlines for cleaning up six other carbon 
black plants under consent decrees with Cabot 
Corporation and Continental Resources that 
had been entered years earlier. The agency 
made no serious effort to justify this extension, 
which allowed Cabot and Continental to back 
out of  enforceable commitments to comply 
with the Clean Air that it had made years  
earlier (Schaeffer and Pelton 2018).
•	 Devon Energy: In February 2018, EPA  
entered into an agreement with Oklahoma-
based Devon Energy that includes a vague 
one-and-a-half-page commitment to audit and 
clean up emissions from its drilling sites that 
will be difficult to enforce, and which requires 
no penalties or expenditures to mitigate the 
damage caused (EIP 2018).
fewer inspectors anD lower  
penalties at epa
Since January 2017, EPA’s Office of  Enforcement 
and Compliance Assurance (OECA) has seen its 
staffing levels shrink dramatically (Dennis, Eilperin, 
and Ba Tran 2018). At EPA headquarters, at least 
73 OECA staff members had left the office and 
only four new ones were hired by late July 2018 
(Rosenberg 2018). As of  April 2018, EPA had 
only 140 criminal investigators on staff, a drop  
of  one-fifth from 2012 levels and below the 200 
agents required under the 1999 U.S. Pollution 
Prosecution Act (Clark 2018).
 Perhaps as a result of  EPA having fewer  
inspectors and looking less critically at pollution 
levels relative to standards, major polluters are 
now less likely to face enforcement actions, pay 
appropriate penalties, or be required to make  
significant investments in pollution control or 
cleanup. During the first year after its inauguration, 
the Trump administration resolved 44% fewer cases 
in federal court and recovered less than half  as 
much in the way of  penalties from polluters, when 
compared to the first year of  the previous three 
administrations. When comparing inflation- 
adjusted totals for civil cases and penalties for  
violations of  major environmental laws such  
EPA is practically inviting unscrupulous 
operators preparing analyses to make 
the kinds of assumptions that are least 
likely to show the need for them to  
invest in additional pollution-control 
equipment.
 Some recent major settlements announced  
by EPA also suggest the agency is failing to take 
an appropriately critical look at what companies 
can and should do to remedy violations:
•	 ExxonMobil: EPA touted an October 31, 
2017, Clean Air Act settlement with Exxon-
Mobil’s eight chemical plants in Texas and 
Louisiana as an example of  EPA’s “commit-
ment to enforce the law.” EPA claimed the  
settlement required ExxonMobil to spend  
$300 million to install pollution controls and 
eliminate hundreds of  tons of  pollutants per 
year, but that estimate included emissions re-
duced since the beginning of  2013, or nearly 
five years before the consent decree took effect. 
In addition, the consent decree’s performance 
standards for several of  the company’s flares 
are already required under pre-existing per-
mits, and in several cases actually authorize 
emissions of  smog-forming chemicals that  
are higher than these permits allow (Schaeffer 
and Pelton 2018).
•	 Carbon Black: EPA advertised another series 
of  settlements that required four companies to 
reduce emissions from ten plants that manufac-
ture carbon black, which is used to make tires 
and other rubber products. But its announce-
ment did not mention its simultaneous decision 
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as the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act (but 
excluding Superfund), the Trump administra- 
tion lodged 48 cases for a total of  $30 million  
in  penalties, compared to 71 cases for $81 million 
in President Barack Obama’s first year and 112 
cases for $70 million in President George W. 
Bush’s first year (Schaeffer and Pelton 2018).   
 The defendants in those judicial actions  
settled in Trump’s first year were expected to 
spend $966 million on pollution controls needed 
to remedy those violations. By contrast, EPA  
anticipated that polluters would spend up to  
$3.8 billion (in inflation-adjusted dollars) in  
cleanup under settlements lodged within President 
Obama’s first year, and $2 billion for those in  
the first year of  President Bush (Schaeffer and 
Pelton 2018).
 EPA typically pursues cases against very large 
polluters, some of  which involve violations at 
many different facilities spread across the United 
States. States frequently lack the resources or  
the political will to sustain enforcement actions 
against corporations that spend millions on legal 
representation and lobbyists (McKelvey 2018). 
That is why Congress gave EPA full authority  
to enforce the Clean Air Act, Clean Water Act, 
and other federal laws, even when states are  
authorized to implement those requirements 
within their borders. Without such enforcement, 
the many responsible companies who make the 
right decisions to clean up emissions or eliminate 
the discharge of  toxic pollutants will be at the 
mercy of  unscrupulous competitors who are  
willing to cut corners. Communities downwind 
or downstream will have to live with unhealthy 
air and water that is not fit for public use. 
less information anD enforcement 
from osha
By enforcing workplace health and safety rules, 
OSHA assures that employers mitigate and elimi-
nate hazards that could otherwise lead to disability 
and death for workers. To carry out its mission 
and target its limited resources, OSHA needs 
timely, reliable information about conditions at 
workplaces. It receives information through its 
own inspections and from employers filing  
mandatory reports of  occupational injuries and 
illnesses. Both sources of  information have been 
significantly weakened.
 As of  January 2018, the number of  federal 
OSHA inspectors had dropped to 764 from 815 
in FY 2017 (AFL-CIO 2018). The decline was 
due in part to the federal hiring freeze, and in  
late 2017 Secretary of  Labor Alexander Acosta 
indicated that the agency had hired additional 
inspectors and was recruiting more (Khimm 
2018). In the meantime, the reduced inspection 
workforce has been accompanied by a drop in 
units of  enforcement, which fell from 42,900 
units in FY 2016 to 41,829 in FY 2017—a drop 
of  1,071 units. In the first five months of  FY 2018 
alone, they fell by a further 1,163 (Berkowitz 2018). 
States frequently lack the resources or 
the political will to sustain enforcement 
actions against corporations that spend 
millions on legal representation and  
lobbyists.
 Enforcement units reflect the complexity  
of  inspections; because some inspections require 
more time and effort, they count for more units. 
While the Labor Department noted that the 
number of  inspections has increased (Khimm 
2018), the drop in enforcement units suggests  
that this increase has come by increasing the num-
ber of  relatively simple, less-resource-intensive 
inspections. OSHA began tracking enforcement 
units rather than simply the number of  inspections 
completed starting in FY 2016 in order to make 
enforcement activity more strategic and remove 
potential disincentives for undertaking complex 
investigations into workplace hazards such as 
heat, chemical exposures, ergonomics, and  
workplace violence (Michaels 2015).
 To obtain a more complete picture of  occu-
pational injuries and illnesses that occur across 
the country, OSHA relies on employers to report 
fatalities, injuries, and illnesses. Employers have 
long been required to keep injury and illness logs, 
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but only under the previous administration were 
they required to submit them to OSHA periodi-
cally. In 2016, OSHA issued a final rule instructing 
employers to submit these logs electronically (with 
some exceptions based on employer size and in-
dustry); the agency would then remove identifying 
information and make the data publicly available 
online (OSHA 2016). With agency and public  
access to information, OSHA explained, “em-
ployers, employees, employee representatives,  
of  the new requirements for electronic injury and 
illness reporting. Specifically, OSHA has proposed 
repealing the reporting of  more detailed injury 
information for establishments with over 250  
employees (OSHA 2018). Given that employers 
are already required to maintain these records, 
the primary result of  this rollback is reduced 
transparency and less agency and public access  
to information that could help reduce occupa-
tional injuries, illnesses, and deaths.
proposeD solutions
To ensure that regulatory agencies are carrying 
out their statutory responsibilities to enforce  
laws that protect public health, Congress should 
hold oversight hearings and initiate inquiries 
when a regulatory agency rolls back reporting 
requirements that advance transparency or  
displays a substantial drop in penalties or   
enforcement units. 
conclusion
Fair and consistent enforcement of  environmen-
tal and workplace health and safety laws averts 
injuries and illnesses that strain families and  
communities and lead to early departures from 
the workforce. Such enforcement can also improve 
public confidence in government. Regulatory 
agencies should have accurate, up-to-date   
information about the power plants, workplaces, 
and other entities under their purview, and they 
should use that information when making   
decisions about penalties and settlements. 
OSHA has proposed repealing the  
reporting of more detailed injury   
information for establishments with  
over 250 employees. The primary result 
of this rollback is reduced transparency 
and less agency and public access  
to information that could help reduce  
occupational injuries, illnesses,   
and deaths.
the government, and researchers may be better 
able to identify and mitigate workplace hazards 
and thereby prevent worker injuries and illnesses” 
(OSHA 2016). OSHA would use this information 
to improve the effectiveness of  its enforcement 
and compliance assistance activities in prevent- 
ing injuries and fatalities. In July 2018, however, 
OSHA proposed a rule that would rescind part  
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C h a p t e r  7 
Conclusion
I
f  the sidelining of  science described in this 
report persists, federal agencies’ reputations  
as respected sources of  information will suffer 
long-term damage. Worse, though, will be the 
consequences of  reversing decades of  progress 
that has improved air and water quality, restored 
and safeguarded biodiversity, reduced unintended 
pregnancy, made workplaces safer, and other- 
wise advanced public health and environmental 
protection.
 In the 2018 survey of  federal scientists by the 
Union of  Concerned Scientists and Iowa State 
University, 39% of  respondents reported that  
the effectiveness of  their divisions or offices had 
decreased over the past year, and 46% reported  
a decrease in personal job satisfaction (Carter, 
Goldman, and Johnson 2018). Morale is lower  
at agencies where respondents reported concerns 
about leadership, including EPA and the U.S. 
Fish and Wildlife Service. Low morale can lead 
to  the departure of  skilled federal employees with 
valuable knowledge, experience, and institutional 
memory. Such departures can both be caused  
by, and exacerbate problems related to, political 
interference with science, and leave agencies less 
equipped to address epidemics, natural disasters, 
and other threats.
  Congress has the power to halt and repair 
damage from federal agencies’ current disregard 
for scientific evidence. Its oversight role is crucial 
in revealing instances in which agencies have ig-
nored or distorted scientific findings, and increased 
oversight can deter future problems. Congress  
has passed legislation, such as whistleblower pro-
tections and sunshine statutes, that contribute to  
a stronger culture of  scientific integrity at federal 
agencies. In order to create a lasting legacy, 
through adequate oversight and vetting, and by 
passing laws that codify strong scientific integrity 
standards and create adequate enforcement 
mechanisms for those standards, Congress can 
help ensure that agencies base decisions on the 
best available science, and secure a healthier and 
more prosperous future for the United States.
Congress has the power to halt and  
repair damage from federal agencies’ 
current disregard for scientific evidence. 
Its oversight role is crucial in revealing 
instances in which agencies have  
ignored or distorted scientific findings, 
and increased oversight can deter  
future problems.
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